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Friedman’s critical analysis of President
John Kennedy’s Cold War leadership.
With The Fifty Year War Friedman
presents a new, provocative survey of the
Cold War from a joint force perspective
while keeping both sides of the Iron
Curtain in mind. He again demonstrates
why he is considered a leading commentator on international security issues.
Unlike Friedman in his broad landscape
of Cold War history, David Winkler
paints a much smaller aspect of the Cold
War canvas. This is a fine work that details the long road to mutual respect,
safety, and communication on the high
seas between the U.S. and Soviet navies.
Utilizing previously classified official
documents, other archival material, and
personal interviews with senior participants from both sides, Winkler traces
the history of confrontations between
U.S. and Soviet naval forces—confrontations that often proved fatal. Eventually, these Cold War incidents
demanded a solution lest the next such
occurrence escalate into outright war.
The solution was found in 1972, in the
historic pact, known as the Incidents at
Sea Agreement (INCSEA).
INCSEA provided a direct navy-to-navy
channel of communication that would
help to limit and avoid future occurrences. How necessary was INCSEA?
Winkler’s first chapter, “Playing with
the Bear,” clearly reveals how “hot” the
Cold War actually was, unbeknownst to
many at the time. During the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations alone,
over one hundred Soviet and U.S. airmen were killed in air-to-air contacts.
Throughout 1971–72, studies and negotiations took place that led to the signing of the INCSEA agreement by then
Secretary of the Navy John Warner and
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Admiral Sergei Gorshkov of the Soviet
navy. Winkler skillfully illustrates how
the successful negotiations were rooted
in mutual respect and professionalism.
This mutual understanding and respect,
along with the signing of INCSEA,
would do much to end naval harassment
between the Cold War superpowers.
As Winkler points out, INCSEA truly
“is one of the positive legacies of the
Cold War.” One should note that although Cold War at Sea represents
first-class scholarship, the Cold War
specialist is more likely to enjoy it than
the armchair sailor. Nevertheless, with
its superb chronology of Cold War naval incidents and excellent notes, this
work will make a welcome addition to
any serious Cold War library.
ANDREW G. WILSON

The George Washington University

Vyborny, Lee, and Don Davis. Dark Waters: An
Insider’s Account of the NR-1, the Cold War’s Undercover Nuclear Sub. New York: New American
Library, 2003. 243pp. $24.95

Although ultimately worthwhile and
entertaining, Dark Waters suffers from
the strange paradox of inadequately describing underwater events that ought to
be gripping while simultaneously portraying mundane and ordinary events
in a marvelously compelling manner.
Lee Vyborny was a new-construction
plank-owner and member of the first
commissioning crew of the U.S. Navy’s
small nuclear-powered submarine NR-1.
Don Davis has written or coauthored
eleven books.
Overall, the book well rewards its readers, but unevenly. An example of its
bumpiness comes early in the prologue
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when the authors state that in World
War II “about half the U.S. submarines
and the men who served in them were
lost,” which, of course, is untrue. Although fifty-two U.S. submarines and
over 3,500 of their heroic crewmembers
were lost, this number represents a fifth
(not half) of the submarines the United
States sent to sea during that war.
Further problems arise when the book
briefly describes the path that took
Vyborny from being an ordinary high
school graduate to becoming a
crewmember of NR-1—the Navy’s
smallest and most mysterious nuclearpowered submarine. The authors certainly do not devote excessive space to
this part of the tale, but their telling of
Vyborny’s early story is just a bit too
self-conscious and self-effacing, lacking
the easy confidence and pride that characterizes much of the rest of the book.
Another criticism arises from an early
passage in which Vyborny relates a 1964
deployment he made as a junior enlisted sailor on the nuclear-powered
submarine USS Sargo to the Sea of Japan. Intended, one presumes, to rival
the swashbuckling tales told in Sontag
and Drew’s Blind Man’s Bluff, the story
of the grounding, jam-dive casualty,
and operational exploits of the USS
Sargo simply are not conveyed in a
manner compelling or even believable
to those with their own submarine experience. One reads them wondering if
they are true. For instance, the authors
state that Sargo passed ten feet directly
underneath a newly launched Echo II
Soviet submarine to “determine if she was
powered by standard diesel engines, or a
nuclear reactor.” It is curious to think
the U.S. Navy would use this method to
ascertain the mode of propulsion of a
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ship class that had already been in service for at least two years.
But these criticisms pale in comparison to
Vyborny’s success in relating how he and
eleven other immensely dedicated men
who made up the first NR-1 crew worked
in the physically demanding environment
of the Electric Boat shipyard to oversee
the construction of the small submarine.
This is the section in which the book truly
shines, as readers get a rare firsthand
glimpse of how a crew, believing with justified conviction that they are elite, come
together to become shipmates and expert
operators of a complex, expensive, amazing machine. Vyborny and Davis’s work
is again excellent when it tells some of the
Admiral Hyman Rickover anecdotes that
Vyborny witnessed during Rickover’s
reign over all the Navy’s nuclearpowered vessels. The authors balance perfectly Rickover’s bizarre idiosyncrasies
against his awesome effectiveness and
offset the fear he engendered against the
respect he earned, neutralizing his routinely acidic abrasiveness with his childlike wonder at the sights of the deep
visible from NR-1’s small windows. Also
masterful is the authors’ depiction of the
routine when operating NR-1, the sacrifices inherent in living for weeks in a
small enclosed space, eating preprocessed
food for days on end, standing miserable
surface watches, and all the other mundane aspects of extended life underwater in
close proximity to a nuclear reactor. These
portions of the book are indeed well told
and will resonate with those who have
gone to sea.
As good as their depictions of the ordinary are, Vyborny and David convey
the dangers of NR-1’s unusual and exceptional missions and experiences in a
less forceful and riveting manner. Perhaps readers have become overexposed
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to and jaded by these kinds of exploits,
or perhaps Dark Waters pulled some of
NR-1’s punches due to classification
considerations. Regardless, the action
sections, though worth reading, are not
up to the high standards of the rest of
the book. Still, Vyborny’s insider account of how NR-1’s first crews built
and operated their ship fully pays back
the reader’s investment. Dark Waters
should be on every submariner’s bookshelf, even if it tells its extraordinary
tale a bit unevenly.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY

Naval War College

Bateman, Robert L. No Gun Ri: A Military History
of the Korean War Incident. Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole, 2002. 288pp. $22.95

On 11 January 2001, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that in
June 1950, U.S. soldiers “killed or injured an unconfirmed number of Korean refugees . . . in the vicinity of No
Gun Ri.” This announcement preceded
the release of an investigation convened
in response to an Associated Press article that documented the massacre of
hundreds of Korean civilians by U.S.
soldiers under orders. The article eventually earned a Pulitzer Prize for the Associated Press and thrust the story to
front-page news.
For nearly fifty years, the No Gun Ri incident languished in the backwaters of
military history. Despite understandable Korean interest, few American researchers delved into this difficult
period until early 1999, when AP correspondents Charles Hanley and Martha
Mendoza uncovered a “smoking gun,”
a confessed U.S. Army massacre
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participant, and broke the story to a
readership anxious to hear about U.S.
wartime atrocities.
The truth is not so simple, however.
According to Bateman, the AP was
working with inconsistent or incorrect
information and knew their version
was questionable before the article was
published. Concurrent with the
Army’s investigation into the incident,
Bateman (an experienced infantry officer himself) examined what transpired
at No Gun Ri and tried to resolve the
discrepancies between what he knew
of 7th Cavalry history, the soldiers
who were there, and the details of the
AP story. From his investigation and
his subsequent writings, Bateman has
captured important aspects of the military reality of that time, the frustrations
associated with presenting unimpeachable history about a fifty-year-old
event, and the dangers of a free press
run amok.
Bateman’s treatise is divided into two
major sections: first, a soldier’s review
of the tactical situation at the end of
July 1950 and the military record of the
events at No Gun Ri; and second, a less
relevant examination of the Associated
Press’s publication of the original story.
The military analysis is generally solid
and clearly backed by an infantry soldier’s appreciation for the life-anddeath challenges that faced young men
of the 7th Cavalry in the early days of
the war. Bateman relies on U.S. primary
sources, extensive interviews, and reconnaissance photographs to debunk
many “facts” reported by the AP and a
group of former Korean refugees who
are now parties to a four-hundredmillion-dollar lawsuit against the U.S.
government. Unfortunately, Bateman
also draws a number of conclusions

3

